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Between uncertainty and controversy: 





The legal regime applicable to Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in the European Union is 
an important witness to the central position assumed by risk in European regulatory and institutional 
reform over the last years. At the European level, the GMO regime provides an archetypical response 
by the regulator to the challenges raised by scientific uncertainty, social controversy and the 
weakening of national frontiers.  
The need to act in situations where knowledge about relevant facts is insufficient or uncertain 
presents a test to the regulator and more generally to a legal system in which the verification or proof 
of the truth has traditionally been the requirement for both activating the law and for determining 
their possible violation. The precautionary principle provides the primary EU response to this 
challenge. Its inclusion in EU legislation on GMOs entails the recognition of the actual lack of 
conclusive evidence of harm which may be caused by the experimental use, the cultivation or 
industrial application of GMOs. At the same time, the extent of the public controversy surrounding 
this biotechnology led the EU to reconsider and possibly reinforce mechanisms for involving the 
civil society in the regulatory process. Yet, at the end of the day, the GMO regime structures the 
whole system for the assessment and management of the risk on the use of science and scientific 
opinions. 
This article seeks to examine this apparent paradox and the way in which the GMO regime attempts 
to resolve it. This analysis will lead us in the end to questioning whether by meeting the risk raised 
by the development and use of GMOs in the way it does, the EU is not generating a sort of 
regulatory failure. 
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Global climatic change, the accumulation of hazardous industrial waste, contaminated foodstuffs, 
new diseases like AIDS or BSE, high voltage electricity transmission grids, genetically modified 
organisms … In some sense the omnipresence of risk in contemporary society shows the flip side of 
its progress. Directly or indirectly associated with technological and industrial development, new 
risks are a matter for particular concern in a society which, paradoxically, has never been so safe.  
Present anxiety about environmental, health and food risks is largely the result of the uncertainty and 
complexity which characterise them: the effects of risk are almost always difficult to predict and 
calculate. There is often insufficient knowledge of the factors that cause risk, as well as the 
conditions or moments which may lead to effective damages. Furthermore, these tend to be dispersed 
and are consequently difficult to control. Risk transcends the limits of traditional authority: it is 
either global, as in the case of the impact of climate change, or comes from a local source (like food 
risk or the risk of catching certain diseases) and it is propagated by people's mobility, commercial 
trade and the transfer of technologies.  
Risk has a tendency to provoke discussion and controversy for all of these reasons. Scientific and 
technical uncertainties, conflicts of interest, economic, ethical and social implications, public 
sensitivity and extensive media coverage converge to turn new risks into a highly politicised issue. 
According to the theorists of risk society, risks are "politically reflexive" precisely because they 
contain the ingredients for a crisis of the political-administrative system and prevailing normative 
models while, at the same time, also shake up the convictions rooted in this model, particularly 
convictions about the objectivity and neutrality of science, the intrinsic goodness of technology or 
the infallibility of administrative decision-making. Risks politicise both industrial and technological 
production processes at the same time and force us to rethink the way they are regulated (Adam et al. 
2000; Beck 1992).  
Risk regulation is now a topical subject. I take risk regulation to mean the intervention of the public 
authorities in the market or in the economic and social processes to control their potentially adverse 
consequences for public health, the environment or the general safety of people and property. Over 
the last few decades, the affirmation of the regulatory paradigm for public action seems to have been 
influenced by the introduction of risk into the social and political agenda. It is a fact that the 
emphasis on regulation (along with the setting up of new types of public entities, the regulatory 
agencies) reflects a new stage in the role of the State, propelled by policy for the privatisation of 
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public companies and the liberalisation of the markets. The perception of new risks emerged in this 
context as an additional driving force for the growth of both the regulatory state and new modes of 
governance (Majone 1996; Black 2002; Black 2005). Political leaders are being forced to depend on 
a more extensive and complex support of structures and agents, and to negotiate their objectives and 
means of action with the very people they govern. 
In reality, risk to the environment and public health is an area which favours the "invention" of legal 
principles and original institutions. While, on the one hand, the regulatory process has to incorporate 
specialised knowledge in these areas, on the other hand, there is accentuated social pressure to bring 
greater transparency and to guarantee more active participation in risk management by interested 
parties and civil society – and the pressure is all the more intense as the scientific uncertainties and 
controversies surrounding risk assessment become more noticeable. Furthermore, the transnational 
incidence of risk makes international co-operation, the action of competent international 
organisations and the clarification of their responsibilities in this area an imperative.  
In the European continent, the European Union (EU) has increasingly favoured regulation (Majone 
1996). In the 1990s European risk regulation was marked by "mad cow" disease. The outbreak of 
BSE caused controversy which had significant political ramifications both in the European 
Community and in several of its Member States. It was associated with a realisation that the lack of 
clear separation between the mission of experts (scientific researchers and advisors) and political 
decision-makers had a negative effect: politicians clearly manipulated scientific reports and used 
them as an argument for delaying the recognition of the danger of this disease and consequently the 
taking of measures to stop it spreading (Ansell and Vogel 2006; Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 
2005).  
Thus, the reform of the EU procedures for food regulation addressed the concern with guaranteeing a 
greater independence of the scientific advisory system, as well as the adoption of more transparent 
practices of the institutions. Three successive phases in the decision-making process for activities or 
products which present a potential risk to the environment or people's health were identified: risk 
assessment (based on science); risk management (or political-administrative decision-making) and 
communication of risk (within the assessment and management system and with the public). This 
differentiation was based on a concept laid down in the European Commission's Communication on 
the Precautionary Principle and in the White Paper on Food Safety (CEC 2000; CEC 1999). 
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This reform also led the creation of a novel entity, the European Food Safety Authority. The main 
functions of EFSA are to issue scientific opinions to the Community, monitor risk and communicate 
it to the public.3 
Against this background, the complex European regime applicable to Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) is an important witness to the central position assumed by risk in European 
regulatory and institutional reform over the last few years. This regulatory effort has been influenced 
by the debate and controversy surrounding biotechnologies which increased during the 1980s and 
1990s in various European countries.  
GMOs regulation undeniably presents a typical example of the consequences of uncertainty, 
controversy and the weakening of national frontiers in a rethinking of the rules and procedures for 
regulation. The need to act in a situation where knowledge about relevant facts is insufficient or 
uncertain is a considerable challenge for the regulator and more generally for a legal system in which 
the verification or proof of the facts has traditionally been the requirement for both activating the law 
and for determining their (possible) violation. At the same time, the extent and diversity of the 
controversy surrounding this biotechnology has brought European and Member States institutions 
together to reconsider mechanisms for involving civil society in the regulatory process. Furthermore, 
though the transnational implications of the trade in GMOs require close co-operation between 
Member States and international organisations like the EU and the World Trade Organisation, the 
variety of the economic interests, perceptions of risk and conflicting social pressures across Europe 
appear to make a consensus more difficult to achieve. 
Against this backdrop, this article seeks to examine the way in which the EU regulatory system has 
responded to the complexity of this regulatory field and, in particular, to  uncertainty in science for 
risk assessment, and to the need to weigh up factors that cannot be appraised using scientific or 
technical criteria, such as economic and social values. We will start by summarising the main 
principles and rules contained in EU regulations and directives on GMOs. In the end, the critical 
analysis of this regime will lead us to questioning whether by meeting the challenges raised by the 
development and use of GMOs in the way it does the EU is not generating a new sort of regulatory 
failure.  
THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN REGIME FOR GMOS
                                                
   
 
3 Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European Parliament and Council, of 28th January 2002, 
which determines the general principles and rules for food legislation, creates the European Authority for Food 
Safety and establishes procedures for the safety of foodstuffs, OJ L 31 of 1.2.2002, p. 1-24. 
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Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are microorganisms, plants or animals whose genetic 
material has been altered artificially by introducing new genes. The most common types of GMOs 
already marketed in Europe are derivatives of soya, maize,  and of oils from different varieties of 
cotton and maize seeds, which have been developed to make them resistant to plagues of insects or 
tolerant to herbicides. Unlike what happens with other improvement methods, the application of this 
technology is subject to detailed regulation in the European Union (EU) today: laboratory research, 
the experimental release of GMOs, the placing of GMOs on the market for cultivation, importation 
or manufacture into industrial products, the placing of food and feed on the market which consist of 
or contain GMOs, are part of a complex and innovative European regime today. 
The following EU legal instruments are presently in force in this area: 
- Directive 90/219/EC, of the European Council, with the latest wording given by Directive 
98/81/EC, which applies to research activities and industrial activities involving genetically modified 
organisms (e.g. viruses and bacteria) in confined conditions (e.g. in the laboratory)4; 
- Directive No. 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and Council, of 12th March 2001, on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms (e.g. field trials) and 
marketing of GMOs for the purposes of cultivation, importation or manufacture into industrial 
products5; 
- Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and Council, of 22nd September 2003, 
on genetically modified food and feed6; and 
- Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and Council, of 22nd September 2003, 
on the traceability and labeling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and 
feed produced from genetically modified organisms.7 
 
Moreover, Regulation No. 1946/2003 rules the transnational movement of genetically modified 
organisms, whether intentional or associated with the exportation of GMOs to third countries8. 
 
4 OJ L 330 de 5.12.1998. 
5 OJ L 106/1, 17.4.2001. 
6 OJ L 268/1, 18.10.2003. 
7 OJ L 268/24, 18.10.2003.  
8 Regulation (EC) No. 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and Council, of 15th July 2003, on the 
transnational movement of genetically modified organisms, OJ L 287/1, 5.11.2003. This regulation lays down a 
common system for notification and information about transnational movements of GMOs and seeks to ensure 
the consistent implementation of the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol to achieve the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity and prevent risk to human health. The EU is party to the Cartagena 
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According to this legal framework, the confined use, experimental release or launching of GMOs or 
GM products on the market should obey to the following basic principles: 
 
i) Prior authorisation by the competent authority; 
ii) Risk assessment as a central component of the authorisation process; and 
iii) The fulfilment of specific requirements for traceability and labelling in the case of GM products. 
 
According to the legislation, the structuring of procedures for the regulation of GMO risk is based on 
the distinction between two phases: risk assessment and management. Risk assessment is the 
responsibility of the competent national authorities (and the respective scientific or technical 
advisory bodies) or the EFSA. Risk management is understood to be the decisions taken by the 
regulatory authority, and is the responsibility of the EU decision-making bodies: the European 
Council and the European Commission within its respective area of executive competence.  
The separation of assessment as a technical process, and management as a political process, formally 
represents the recognition of the ultimately political nature of the decisions made about the risks 
associated with GMOs. As indicated above, this separation is incorporated into both political and 
legal discourse in theory. Yet, it does not seem to be quite so clear in practice, as it will be shown 
below.  
Procedures for authorisation in the case of experimental release and release for cultivation, 
importation and transformation into industrial products are initiated by the competent authority of the 
Member State in whose territory the release should be made (Article 6, paragraphs 5 and 8 of 
Directive 2001/18/EC). The request by the interested entity, most often a company, should be 
accompanied by a technical dossier and an environmental risk assessment. The authority issues an 
opinion in the form of an assessment report. If its opinion is negative, the company may submit a 
fresh notification to the competent authority of another Member State. If this assessment is positive, 
the Member State sends the assessment report to the European Commission, which circulates it 
among the remaining Member States, who may make observations and objections. If there are no 
objections, the national authority which carried out the initial assessment authorises the product's 
entry into the market.  
Protocol on Biosafety, annex to the Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP), in force since 11th September 2003. The protocol was incorporated into European 
legislation by Directive No. 2001/18/EC.  
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If there are objections, the legislation foresees a phase of conciliation between Member States, the 
European Commission and the notifier. If objections remain, the Commission requests the opinion of 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), after which the Commission initiates the process 
known as “commitology”9: the Commission presents a proposal for a decision to the competent 
regulatory committee which is composed of representatives from the Member States. If this 
Committee votes in favour by qualified majority, the Commission adopts the decision. If the 
Committee rejects it, the proposal is submitted to the Council of Ministers for its adoption or 
rejection by qualified majority. If the Council fails to reach an agreement within three months, the 
Commission adopts the decision – an imperative which suggests an absence of discretion.10  
Two comments may be made about this mechanism. Firstly, it is based on the close articulation of 
the EU institutions with the administrative authorities of the Member States which, in the case of 
disagreement, refer the decision to the European Commission. Secondly, the mechanism appears to 
have been designed to prevent decision-making deadlocks. However, precisely because the issues in 
question are highly sensitive politically, the neglect of national concerns becomes even more 
problematic in circumstances where qualified majorities are not possible.  
In reality, in numerous situations where the Council did not reach an agreement in due time (i.e. 30 
days), the Commission, in the exercise of its powers, did proceed with the authorisation of GMOs, 
including those for use in food and feed, in the face of a divided Council of Ministers and a public 
opinion particularly concerned about this issue. For example, in August 2005, the European 
Commission approved the importation of a strain of genetically modified maize (MON863) from 
Monsanto for use in feed. Monsanto's request had not been supported by a majority in the Council of 
Environment Ministers of 24th June of that year: the majority of governments abstained or voted 
against it. In accordance with Directive 2001/18/EC, the final decision reverted to the European 
Commission which authorized the placing of MON863 in the internal market despite the opposition 
by the various governments. 11 
 
9 "Commitology" is defined as the process for adopting measures to implement EU legislative acts by the 
Commission, which is assisted in this process by an expert committee appointed by the Member States. 
10 Decision of the European Council of 28th June 1999, which sets the rules for the way the European 
Commission exercises its competencies (1999/468/EC).  
11 Commission Decision of 8 August 2005 concerning the placing on the market, in accordance with Directive 
2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of a maize product (Zea mays L., line MON 863) 
genetically modified for resistance to corn rootworm, OJ L 207/17, 25.8.2005.  See also Press release: GMOs: 
Commission reaction on Council votes on safeguards and GM maize MON863, 24.06.2005, accessed at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/793&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN 
(27 June 2008).   
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While the regulation of the release of GMOs addresses concerns about the protection of the 
environment, the regulation of genetically modified food and feed is more sensitive to the need to 
protect consumers. Its main objective is "to ensure a high level of protection of human life and 
health, animal health and welfare, environment and consumer interests in relation to genetically 
modified food, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market” (Article 1 of 
Regulation 1829/2003). Under the terms of this regulation, “foodstuffs must not have adverse effects 
on human health, animal health or the environment”, “mislead the consumer", or “differ from the 
food which it is intended to replace to such an extent that its normal consumption would be 
nutritionally disadvantageous to the consumer” (Article 4, paragraph 1). 
In contrast to the procedure regulating the deliberate release of GMOs and their placing on the 
market which actively involves the national authorities, the procedure for food and feed is centralised 
in the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The national authorities only receive requests from 
companies to authorise the introduction of transgenic foods and then refer them on to the EFSA. 
Applications should be accompanied by a risk assessment study and a plan for monitoring their 
effect on the environment.  
Authorisation is granted on the basis of a single risk assessment carried out by the EFSA. The 
Commission may disagree with the EFSA's opinion, in which case it must justify its position. Here 
again the European Commission also makes the final decision or rather, manages the"risk" according 
to the procedures of commitology: the Member States work within the framework of the Standing 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (Articles 35 and 58 of Regulation No. 178/2002). 
The European Commission also makes the final decision to grant or refuse authorisation, if the 
Committee and the Council have not been able to decide by qualified majority within the fixed time 
limit.12  
The traceability of GMOs makes it possible to follow the product from their manufacture to their 
distribution to check whether labelling requirements are complied with, in order to control potential 
adverse effects on health and the environment and to remove them from the market should any 
unforeseen risks be detected. Labelling requirements aim to inform the consumer or user about the 
product, thereby enabling them to make an informed choice. Regulation No. 1830/2003, which 
establishes the requirements to be fulfilled in these areas, is applied to all GMOs authorised to 
circulate in the European market, be they food, seeds etc.   
 
12 Cf. Decision cited in footnote 9.  
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However, starting from the assumption that it is practically impossible to manufacture products 
which are 100% pure, products are exempted from the obligations stipulated if they contain under 
0.9% of traces of GMO traces, on the condition that this presence is adventitious or technically 
unavoidable, or rather, the producers have to show that they have taken the appropriate steps to 
prevent the presence of this material (Article 4, paragraphs 7 and 8). Also excluded are meat, milk or 
eggs obtained from animals which are fed or treated medically with GMO products. In addition, the 
presence of up to 0.5% of GMOs is accepted as long as the products have been assessed scientifically 
and shown to present no risk for the environment and health, though formal approval is still pending. 
According to the Commission's services,  
 
“This exemption aims to resolve the problem faced by operators who want to avoid using 
GMOs, but find that their products still contain a low percentage of genetically modified 
material due to accidental or technically unavoidable contamination.” (CEC 2007). 
 
It is also considered practically impossible to prevent the presence of GMOs in agricultural crops or 
in the handling, storage or transport of non-GMO products originating in EU or other countries, as is 
the case for other products. The EU indeed explicitly accepts the co-existence of different types of 
crops based on the principle of freedom of choice for both the consumer and the farmer. The 
"Guidelines for the development of national strategies and best practices to ensure the co-existence 
of genetically modified crops with conventional agriculture and organic farming” 13 are 
recommended to regulate this co-existence and, to a certain extent, to protect conventional and 
organic crops from possible contamination by GMOs. In this case, the EU option was to issue 
general guidelines, formally non-compulsory, which gives the Member States the authority to decide 
on the specific conditions and limits to be respected for the cultivation of GMOs.14 
Though the term "contamination" may have a negative connotation, the recommendation does 
actually accept it within certain limits, while imposing no more than the tolerance thresholds 
 
13 Commission Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on guidelines for the development of national strategies and 
best practices to ensure the coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming 
(2003/556/EC), OJ L 189, 29.7.2003, p. 36-47 in 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/reports/coexistence2/guide_en.pdf.  
14Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Report on the 
implementation of national measures on the coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and 
organic farming, COM (2006) 104 final, Brussels, 9.3.2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/coexistence/com104_en.pdf.  
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stipulated.15 At the same time, the recommendation expresses a concern with ensuring that sufficient 
and cost-effective measures are taken. One foremost objective indeed appears to be to prevent 
excessive burdens on farmers who choose to cultivate transgenics.  
In sum, the assumption is that possible impacts on the environment and health are upstream issues, 
or rather, that they have already been considered and resolved during the science-based risk 
assessment process for authorising the use of GMOs in farming.  
 
 
UNCERTAINTY AND PRECAUTION: TOWARDS A “REGULATED SCIENCE”
                                                
  
The European legislator has responded to the persisting scientific uncertainties in this area 
with the precautionary principle. According to this principle, the environment and health 
should be given the benefit of the doubt when there is no conclusive proof as to the risk of 
serious and irreversible harm due to a certain activity or product. This principle is applied 
typically to cases where, despite the fact that a preliminary scientific study shows that it is 
legitimate to fear potentially dangerous effects of a phenomenon, product or process on the 
environment and on human and animal health or vegetation sanitation, the data available is 
insufficient and inconclusive and does not make it possible to determine risk with sufficient 
certainty (CEC 2000).  
Contrary to the traditional emphasis on compensating for damage once the damage has been 
done, precaution attempts to anticipate dangers which are likely to have adverse or 
irreversible effects on the environment, health or human safety more generally. The 
precautionary principle consequently encourages the development of procedures which 
make the framing and regulation of risk possible. This contrasts with the prevention 
principle, which was prevalent until the 1990s. This principle assumes prior knowledge of 
the impacts of products or activities on the environment; it is based on certainties and proof, 
while decisions bases on the precautionary principle are taken even if there are still 
uncertainties about those impacts.  
The precautionary principle was introduced into the European legal system by the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992) (Article 174 - Environment Policy), and has been translated into different 
 
15 Point 2.1.4 of the “Guidelines”. 
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types of sectoral Community legislation since that time. One example is the legislation on 
GMOs. GMO risk management is guided by this principle (Article 1 of Directive No. 
2001/18/EC). Regulation No. 1829/2003 makes no explicit reference to precaution, but is 
implicitly ruled by it, given the subsidiary applicability of Directive No. 2001/18/EC. In its 
turn, Regulation No. 1830/2003 subjects traceability to the precautionary principle (Whereas 
3).  
This principle thus not only guides the initial decision of the competent national or 
Community authority, but also the release or marketing of GMOs once they have been 
licensed16. If new information about unforeseen adverse effects becomes available after the 
notification or decision, the authorities must reassess the situation, and may require the 
modification of conditions for the deliberate release of GMOs or even suspend or terminate 
it (Article 8 of Directive No. 2001/18/EC). Member States may also provisionally prohibit 
or restrict the use and/or sale of GMOs or transgenic products in their territory, when new or 
additional information is made available after authorisation has been granted or a new 
assessment has been made of existing information based on new or additional scientific 
knowledge and shows that there are valid reasons for considering that they are a risk to the 
environment or to health (the "safeguard clause" foreseen in Article 23 of Directive No. 
2001/18/EC). In this case, the Member States must base their measures on a new (scientific) 
risk assessment. The Commission makes the final decision once the competent scientific 
committee has been consulted.  
It should be noted however, that the precautionary principle regulates the decision-making 
process, but does not determine the prohibition of GMOs when there is doubt as to their 
innocuous nature. According to the European Commission's Communication on the 
precautionary principle, "in some cases the correct response may be to do nothing or at least 
not to introduce a binding legal measure. If it decides to act, a vast range of initiatives is 
available, including binding legal measures, a research project or recommendation.” (CEC 
 
16 In whereas 8, Directive No. 2001/18/EC declares that: “The precautionary principle has been taken into 
account for the drafting of this directive and must also be taken into account when implementing it.” Article 4 
(1) adds that "the Member States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle, assure that all 
appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and the environment which may 
arise from the deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs.” Parts B and C describe procedures for 
notification and authorisation to be followed in each case. 
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2000). Precaution effectively gives the competent authorities (Member States and European 
Commission) a wide margin of discretion for deciding on acceptable levels of risk.  
The question to be asked is therefore: how is this power distributed and exercised? 
In order to answer this question, first of all it should be noted that the definition of risk and, 
consequently, the prohibition or authorisation of GMO with or without conditions are based 
on the results of an assessment to be made by scientists and experts appointed for this 
purpose. Central to the use of precaution is therefore the scientific study of risk. This is 
really the decisive phase for the preliminary authorisation of GMOs.17 Risk monitoring is 
also supported by "systematic and independent research". Besides, the measures to be taken 
for the co-existence of crops must be reviewed as more "scientific and technical progress" is 
made: the Member States are invited by Recommendation 2003/556/EC to promote research 
in partnership with the interested parties on the best ways of ensuring that co-existence.18 
In all, despite the structural division of the regulatory system into the (scientific) assessment 
of risk and the (political) decision to authorise GMOs (or not), the latter is sustained by the 
former. Scientific information and arguments dominate the regulatory process from the 
moment the decision is notified and follow the "life" of the GMOs, and of the crops and 
products which use them.  
Here we find an apparent paradox in the system: though on the one hand it is based on the 
precautionary principle, which recognises the lack of conclusive evidence or proof of harm 
which may be caused by the cultivation or use of GMOs, or in other words, it recognises 
 
17 In Annex II of Directive 2001/31/EC entitled "Principles applicable to environmental risk assessment” gives 
details of the principles and methodology to be followed in risk assessment. 
18 The Court of Justice has explicitly valued the role of science as a precautionary instrument, while at the 
same time accepting the importance to stimulate the continuous progress of scientific research in order to fill 
these gaps in knowledge. In one of its decisions concerning the BSE, the Court expressly affirmed the "need to 
scientifically increase the range of new information and measures to be taken and consequently the need to 
review this measure" ((Decision of 5th May 1998 - The Queen c. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
Commissioners of Customs & Excise, ex parte National Farmers' Union, David Burnett and Sons Ltd, R. S. and 
E. Wright Ltd, Anglo Beef Processors Ltd, United Kingdom Genetics, Wyjac Calves Ltd, International Traders 
Ferry Ltd, MFP International Ltd, Interstate Truck Rental Ltd and Vian Exports Ltd. - Preliminary ruling 
procedure: High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division - United Kingdom - Case C-157/96). 
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scientific uncertainty, on the other hand it structures the whole system for the assessment 
and management of risk on the use of science and scientific opinions.  
At the same time, it creates a strong challenge to the traditional legal model which is based 
on the verification and demonstration of the facts. Legal and regulatory institutions open up 
to the idea of uncertainty, formally accept it and incorporate it into their discourse. However, 
even under these circumstances, the legal and politico-administrative decision-making 
authorities still need to be solidly legitimated. Science continues to offer this solid 
legitimisation despite its recognised limitations politically and administratively within the 
context of risk assessment. 
The solution for this dilemma between the certainties required by law and the uncertainties 
offered by science seems to be a "regulated" science at the end of the day. The recognition 
of uncertainties about the production and use of scientific knowledge for risk assessment has 
not prevented it from being taken into consideration for the regulatory process - in fact the 
opposite is the case. The precautionary principle may then be regarded as "a means of dealing with 
scientific uncertainty, not a way of rejecting science” (Cazala 2004).   
In general, the reorganisation of food risk regulation at European level was also based on the 
conviction that the social credibility of the regulatory systems is only possible if the 
authorities can strengthen the authority of science and publicly guarantee its independence 
from economic and political interests. The system of scientific advice for consumer 
protection and health was consequently reformed extensively during the second half of the 
1990s, when a Scientific Steering Committee and eight new scientific committees were 
created, with longer mandates, to substitute those already existing. These bodies functioned 
in a more transparent and open way. This process also led to the establishment of the 
European Food Safety Authority, which incorporates the structure of the European 
institutions for scientific advice on food quality and safety, and naturally includes 
genetically modified foods.  
Within the GMO regime, the use of scientific opinion and the promotion of scientific 
research indeed became legally framed in a strict manner. This regulation is expressed in a 
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series of obligations imposed either on the producers of GMOs or on the regulatory 
authorities, including:  
i) The obligation to carry out scientific risk assessments;  
ii) The obligation to promote "systematic and independent research" once GMOs have been 
authorised or placed on the market, and 
iii) The requirement for Member States to present scientific grounds if they plan to invoke 
the safeguard clause. 
 
The role of science and scientific advice throughout the GMO regulatory processes thereby 
opens the way to a continuous dialogue between administrative bodies and the world of 
science and leads them to judge in each particular circumstance whether the scientific data 
available is valid and sufficient for determining acceptable risk. This framework also means 
that a growing role is played by the courts in the examination of the scientific demonstration 
which will be used as the basis for political and administrative decision-making in this area 
and for appraising its suitability according to the data and knowledge available at each given 
moment.19 These phenomena represent a radical change from the traditional concept of 
science as a self-regulated and independent profession.  
Furthermore, it is important to clarify what kind of scientific practice we are talking about in 
the context of GMO regulation: this is essentially scientific advice. This advice is given by 
experts and should be seen as separate to both the science used in the design of legislation 
and administrative regulations and from laboratory science (Jasanoff 1990). While the latter 
can theoretically identify its objectives and procedures on an independent basis, so-called 
“regulatory science” is developed to support legislative or regulatory decision-making and 
favours brevity and prediction. In its turn, scientific advice consists of issuing opinions 
supported by the knowledge provided by experts in response to requests from the political 
 
19 For example, in a much discussed decision, the Court of the First Instance confirmed the legality of the 
Council regulation which applied the precautionary principle to prohibit the marketing of an additive used in 
animal feed. This prohibition was based on the assumption of a relationship between the use of this additive 
as a factor for growth in animals and man's resistance to certain antibiotics. The Court considered the risk to 
be "sufficiently documented by the scientific data available.” (Decision of the Court of the First Instance (Third 
Section) of 11th September 2002, Pfizer Animal Health SA against the Council of the European Union, Case T-
13/99, Jurisprudence Collection 2002 page II-03305).  
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authorities. It tends to comply with political imperatives and time constraints, and with more 
flexible requirements for proof. Though supported by scientific knowledge, the role of the 
experts is hybrid and they are unlikely to avoid bringing socio-political judgements into their 
assessment.  
The regulatory framework for GMOs seems to ignore these differences and neglect the 
valuative dimension of any risk assessment exercise, accentuated as we have seen by the 













FROM PRECAUTION TO PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: RESOLVING A REGULATORY 
FAILURE? 
 
"The reform of the food safety institutions following the panic created by BSE, tended 
to accentuate rather than resolve the controversy surrounding the institutional 
relationship between risk assessment (scientific assessment and advice) and risk 
management (normalisation and application of regulations)." (Ansell and Vogel 2006). 
 
This comment suggests that the way the EU has reorganised food risk regulation, 
particularly with the creation of EFSA, has subverted the objectives declared at its genesis. 
This observation seems equally valid for the European regulation of GMOs.  
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As we have seen, the strategy followed in this area was to focus on authorisation procedures 
based on risk assessment, in other words to take the politics out of intrinsically complex 
problems by delegating their solutions to experts. Yet, the public realisation of the 
uncertainties of science and of differences of opinion among experts has caused people to 
question their independence and impartiality. In fact, despite investment in the study of 
GMO impacts, there is still a great lack of knowledge about their implications on public 
health and the environment, particularly in the long term. Within the Council of Ministers 
divergences of position have been expressed among EU Member States with respect to 
specific genetically modified plant varieties or products, backed by conflicting scientific 
opinions of national scientific institutions or advisers provide evidence. The public is then 
led to ask even more questions when confronted with political rhetoric and practices which 
still adhere to outmoded notions of truth or proof. Furthermore, in addition to real risks there 
are perceived risks, or rather, a fear, particularly of the unknown, which tends to spread 
throughout the population (Slovic  2002). 
GMOs are indeed a paradigmatic case of contested technology. According to the latest 
survey on "The Europeans and Biotechnology" by the Eurobarometer, though those taking 
part in the survey were receptive to the applications of biotechnology in the area of medicine 
(so-called "red biotechnology"), 58% rejected their use for agriculture and food ("green 
biotechnology") (Gaskell 2006). This rejection has much to do with the dispute about 
transgenic food promoted in various countries by either farmers who work in conventional 
and organic farming or by consumer or environmental protection agencies (particularly in 
countries like Austria, Greece and France). Active conflicts of interest and opinion among 
farmers and producers, including multinational companies, consumer and environmental 
protection associations and political parties as to the pros and cons, costs and benefits, 
opportunities and risks of GMOs, plus controversies within the scientific community, have 
sharply underlined the importance of the choices to be made and the fact that the 
acceptability of risk is an essentially political issue. As we have seen, this acceptability 
depends not only on the assessment of what might happen if the foreseen dangers actually 
come to pass, but also the "kind of world we want to live in" (Lee 2005). For all of these 
reasons, the controversy surrounding genetic engineering was seen as a unique opportunity 
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for democratising the decision-making processes. But has the EU meet up such 
expectations? 
As Torgensen pointed out, “the difficulties surrounding GMOs have worsened precisely 
because debates, regulations and policies only focus on risk" (technically defined) and have 
"neglected other issues" (Torgensen 2004). The underlying assumption appears to be that 
genetic engineering and its applications are a good in themselves and it is only important to 
guarantee that they are safe. In this context, the attempts of the political powers to base their 
authority only on science (though recognizably in constant progress) run the "risk" of 
proving blind to the requirements of the regulation and management of new risks such as 
those associated with GMOs. In order to function efficiently, risk regulation regimes depend 
both on their reliance in the judgment of experts and in the opinion of laymen (Hood, 
Rothstein and Baldwin 2004). 
In the case of GMOs, the European legislator has addressed the special concerns of the 
public by setting up information and communication mechanisms. But to what extent are 
these mechanisms helping to pave the way to more informed decisions which are more 
receptive to the interests and values in question and more socially welcome? 
According to the European legislation on GMOs, the regulatory authorities (Member States 
or European Commission depending on the case) should keep the public informed as part of 
the authorisation procedure. This is what happens when GMOs are experimentally released 
or placed on the market (Articles 9 and 24 of Directive No. 2001/18/EC). The public may 
access the data available and the assessment reports, and present their comments within 30 
days of their publication. The opinion of the competent authority on foodstuffs containing or 
consisting of GMOs should also be made public, and any person may present comments 
within 30 days (Article 6, paragraph 7, of Regulation Nº 1829/2003). The public must also 
be informed of authorised releases or of the registered location of cultivated GMOs and the 
results of monitoring activities.  
Yet, there are still considerable legal and political barriers to making decisions in this area 
on the basis of factors which go beyond scientific and technical analysis. The essentially 
technical nature of assessment reports and opinions and the limited time available for 
consultation, raise the doubt whether the involvement of interested parties and the general 
Between uncertainty and controversy: 
Has the European Union actually responded to the challenges of GMO regulation? 
 
 
DINÂMIA – CENTRO DE ESTUDOS SOBRE A MUDANÇA SOCIOECONÓMICA  
ISCTE, Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL  
Tel. 217938638 Fax. 217940042 E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt www.dinamia.iscte.pt 
19
                                                
public actually means that they have any real influence over the decisions made. Some 
governments have admitted that most of the observations they receive are far too general to 
be taken into consideration .20 Besides, the European Commission has given clear signs that 
it underestimates the importance of this type of consultation. The Commission rejected the 
possibility of adopting a compulsory instrument in this area, arguing that this would work 
against "the need to achieve timely political decisions", as well as "the expectations of 
citizens that the European institutions actually produce something substantial rather than 
concentrate on procedures".21 This attitude otherwise leads to the understanding expressed in 
the White Paper on Governance in which a rhetoric of openness is contradicted by a 
proclamation of the need for "better and "faster" regulation" and by an explicit concern with 
speeding up the decision-making processes (CEC 2001).  
It is true that Regulation No. 1829/2003 stipulates that decisions about new transgenic foods 
must take into account not only scientific opinions, but also "other legitimate interests", and 
accepts the possibility of the Commission consulting ethical committees and specifically the 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (Article 33). But this is in the 
end a group of "ethical experts" (Wynne et al. 2007). And here once again it is the experts 
who have to translate social sentiments.  
The lack of a clear institutional framework as a vehicle for ethical, cultural or social 
sensibilities on this subject reduces the protection of people's interests to their quality as 
consumers, which is a central objective of the regulation applicable to food and feed. 
Consumers are protected by product labelling, which presumably allows consumers to make 
informed choices.  
Labelling is obligatory for all food and feed (Regulation No. 1829/2003), as it is for other 
products consisting of or containing GMOs (Regulation No. 1830/2003), which has been 
considered to be extended to products in which GMOs have been used for their production. 
Excluded are those products which have been "produced with" GMOs such as meat or milk 
from cattle fed with nutrients which contain GMOs (Lee 2005). Neither is labelling 
 
20 Cf. Second Report of the Commission and Council on the experience of the Member States with GMOs 
placed on the market within the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC [SEC (2007) 274].  
21 Cf. Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - general principles and minimal rules for the 
consultation of the interested parties by the Commission [COM (2002) 174].  
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obligatory for food or food ingredients containing up to 0.9% of genetically modified 
material as long as the presence of this material is "fortuitous" or "technically unavoidable" 
(Article 12, 4).  
Besides the limited types of information made public, it can always be alleged that access to 
information in itself does not guarantee society any real power to influence GMO regulation. 
There is a second paradox in the system on this point. Public consultation takes place during 
the assessment stage and involves technical reports or opinions. The information included on 
labels for transgenic products is also usually transmitted in a specialised language. In 
addition to the difficulty for the common man to understand this information, the function of 
product labels or the explanations transmitted by entities like the EFSA (in its function as a 
communicator of risk) may be seen as a subtle way for the regulatory authorities to share the 
responsibility for risk management with the virtual consumer or user; or as Bauman 
correctly observed, as a "counterfactual privatisation of risk" (Bauman 1996). 
Though in the last instance, choices which may have effects on the environment or on health 
(whether to acquire or use them, whether to run the risk) are delegated to the individual as 
consumer or user, any real power to influence important decision-making in this area still 
escapes them.  
Instead of providing access to information and public consultation in the risk assessment 
phase, would it not be more appropriate to involve the public in the risk management phase, 
or rather, when the basic decisions are taken to either authorise or reject the release of 
GMOs into the environment or the placing transgenic products on the market? This is the 
right time to bring the "other legitimate interests" of ethical and cultural, economic and 
social considerations into play. 
As we have seen, the separation of risk assessment from risk management aimed to both 
guarantee the independence of the experts and to clarify the political responsibility of 
governments and administrations. This separation expressed recognition of the essentially 
political nature of risk regulation. By making the authorisation of GMOs largely dependent 
on science and experts, the European regulator has challenged this orientation and has 
started off a movement towards depoliticising this area, which has worked against the 
effective democratisation of this controversial innovation. 
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The difficulties for the regulation of GMOs are partly structural: the newness of the issues to 
be regulated, the lack of data and reliable information available, and in spite of that, the 
strict obedience of political leaders to scientific opinion, all compete together and make the 
problems of credibility and efficiency in this area of regulation more persistent. The latter 
are exacerbated by a global market dominated by a small number of multinational 
companies in the biotechnological sector, one that it is not easy control.  
Further obstacles are created by differing policies between Member States of the EU. 
Though the main objective of European directives and regulations on GMOs is to bring 
together and harmonise national legislative, regulatory and administrative provisions, their 
application in the member countries is not homogeneous. Work to harmonise legislation and 
co-ordinate institutions comes into conflict with the different dynamics in the farming sector 
and of social movements and organisations. The Europeanization of scientific advice 
through EFSA has not prevented the internal authorities from assuming differing positions. 
One specific indication of these differences has been the invocation of the safeguard clause 
laid down in Article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC. Since this directive came into force, some 
Member States have maintained temporary prohibitions of authorised GMOs. However, in 
none of these cases did the EFSA consider that these measures were justified due to lack of 
scientific proof, which led the Commission to ask the governments in question to lift the 
bans22.  
In view of the problems brought by the present regulatory framework for GMOs, it might 
make sense to follow one of two directions (or both):  
 
i) To extend and reinforce mechanisms for risk management with a view to involve in 
an effective manner interested parties and the public at large in these mechanisms; 
 
 
22 Cf., With respect to a recent case involving Austria, see Decision of the Commission of 7 May 
2008concerning the provisional prohibition of the use and sale in Austria of genetically modified maize (Zea 
mays L. line T25) pursuant to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(2008/470/EC), OJ 162/31, 21.6.2008; and  the Press Release of the 2826th Session the Environment Council, 
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ii) To design forms of public involvement in the "co-production", that is the 
construction, control and validation, of scientific and expert knowledge used in risk 
assessment (as suggested by Nowotny et al. 2001); and  
 
 
iii) To rethink the now dominant concept of risk underlying the GMO regulations and 
procedures taking it beyond ecological and consumer risk to the "risk" incurred when 
exercising basic rights such as the freedom to say yes or no to the manipulation of life, and 
the actual dignity of the individual (what Brownsword names “rights-related risks”) 




The regulation of GMOs by the European Union addresses a particularly complex issue in view of 
the scientific uncertainties and the social controversies which involve this biotechnology, as well as 
the transnational nature of its production and uses. This article sought to examine the way in which 
the EU regulatory system has responded to the special complexity of this regulatory field and, in 
particular, to uncertainty in science for risk assessment, and to the need to weigh up factors that 
cannot be appraised using scientific or technical criteria, such as economic and social values.   
The strategy followed was to focus on authorisation procedures based on risk assessment. Risk 
assessment relies primarily on the work and advice of scientific experts, which the EU recent reform 
has in part Europeanized through the restructuring of its scientific advisory committees and the 
creation of EFSA. However, the public acknowledgment of uncertainties of science and 
disagreements among experts, as well as differing policies of EU Member States (related in part to 
the specific features of the agriculture sectors) have underlined the importance of the choices to be 
made whenever a novel genetically modified plant variety or product is submitted for authorisation, 
and the fact that the acceptability of risk is an essentially political issue. For all of these reasons, the 
controversy surrounding genetic engineering was seen as a unique opportunity for democratising the 
decision-making processes.  
Yet, the EU does not appear to have met up this expectation due to excessive reliance on science-
based safety tests to the detriment of the relevant social and economic values at stake. While the 
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separation of risk assessment from risk management aimed to both guarantee the independence of the 
experts and to clarify the political responsibility of governments and administrations, by making the 
authorisation of GMOs largely dependent on science and experts the European regulator started off a 
contradictory movement for taking politics out of the process, which has worked against the effective 
democratisation of this controversial innovation. 
Thus the real challenge appears to be that of converting the system for the regulation of GMOs from 
a system principally based on expertise into a system also founded on values (Steele 2005). But for 
this to happen, concepts like that of risk and ideas deeply rooted in the world of law and regulation 
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